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Abstract
Real-time bidding, as one of the most popular
mechanisms for selling online ad slots, facilitates
advertisers to reach their potential customers. The
goal of bidding optimization is to maximize the ad-
vertisers’ return on investment (ROI) under a cer-
tain budget setting. A straightforward solution is
to model the bidding function in an explicit form.
However, the static functional solutions lack gener-
ality in practice and are insensitive to the stochas-
tic behaviour of other bidders in the environment.
In this paper, we propose a general multi-agent
framework with actor-critic solutions facing against
playing imperfect information games. We firstly
introduce a novel Deep Attentive Survival Anal-
ysis (DASA) model to infer the censored data in
the second price auctions which outperforms start-
of-the-art survival analysis. Furthermore, our ap-
proach introduces the DASA model as the oppo-
nent model into the policy learning process for each
agent and develop a mean field equilibrium analysis
of the second price auctions. The experiments have
shown that with the inference of the market, the
market converges to the equilibrium much faster
while playing against both fixed strategy agents and
dynamic learning agents.
1 Introduction
Real-time bidding (RTB) is a leading online ad inventory
trading mechanism in which each ad display is sold through
real-time auctions. It allows the advertisers to target potential
users with click or purchase interests on the impression level.
In RTB, each bidding agent is involved in a highly dynamic
bidding environment with an unknown number of competi-
tors. In real-time bidding, second price auctions [Krishna,
2009] are usually held where the winner is the one with the
highest bid and pays the second highest price. In theory, to
reach the Nash equilibrium of the static second price auction,
bidders are encouraged to submit their estimation of impres-
sion’s true value as the bid price [Krishna, 2009]. However,
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in practice, the market may not always maintain the ideal
equilibrium due to various reasons. For instance, bidders are
constrained by their budget. To avoid running out of money
quickly without observing more valuable impressions, the op-
timal bid price usually deviates from its true value. In addi-
tion, the number of participants in each auction is unknown
and from each bidder’s perspective, it may compete with dif-
ferent opponents at every step during its lifetime. To obtain
the optimal bidding strategy in such a stochastic game with a
large number of unknown participants is the major challenge
in RTB.
The dynamics in the RTB market mostly come from the
hybrid behavior of each bidder. It is important for an intelli-
gent bidding agent to inference its opponents’ strategy while
optimizing its own strategy. In [He et al., 2016], a deep-Q-
Network (DQN) based multi-task reinforcement learning ar-
chitecture is proposed to jointly learn a policy for an agent
and the behavior of its opponents in a multi-player game.
The model requires features from opponents as input. Sim-
ilar ideas have been studied in the RTB domain [Jin et al.,
2018], the authors investigate the optimal bidding strategy in
a fully observable multi-agent bidding environment, where
each agent knows each other’s budget and obtained reward
at every step. However, in practice, each bidder is not aware
of the configuration of its competitors and the competitor set
varies in every auction.
With the number of opponents increasing, modeling every
opponent’s action becomes implausible and computationally
expensive. In addition, given the nature of the second price
auctions, only part of the opponent’s actions can be observed
by each agent. To analyze such highly dynamic games with
incomplete information and large number of participants, the
Mean Field Theory [Stanley, 1971] has been employed. A
scalable policy learning solution for multi-player games is
proposed in [Yang et al., 2018]. The core idea is to find
the optimal actions for one agent in response to the mean
action of its neighbors. In this way, instead of modeling ac-
tions from all the agents in the environment, the mean ac-
tion of N neighbors represents the action distribution of all
neighboring agents. In addition, in [Gummadi et al., 2012;
Iyer et al., 2011], the authors extensively analyzed and proved
the existence of the Mean Field Equilibrium (MFE) in the dy-
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namic bidding environment.
Inspired by the prior studies, we firstly address the par-
tially observable opponent actions by adopting a Deep Atten-
tive Survival model which greatly outperforms the state-of-
the-art survival models. Furthermore, our solution integrates
the opponent model into the policy learning framework for
actor-critic based bidding agents. We take the second highest
price as the aggregated action of all the other bidders, which
enables each bidder to optimize its policy together with mod-
eling the uncertainty of the market. Our experiments have
shown the equilibrium under different budget constraints and
faster convergence in the multi-agent environment.
2 Related Work
Bid optimization is one of the key components in the deci-
sion making process in RTB. It aims to optimize the bid price
on the impression level which maximizes the potential profits
under a certain budget constraint. Many research works have
formulated it as a functional optimization problem [Perlich et
al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2014a] However, the functional based
methods have strong assumptions of the model form and fail
to incorporate the dynamics in the bidding environment and
the bidder’s budget spending status into the model.
To address the above shortage in the prior studies, much
research efforts have been focused on Reinforcement Learn-
ing (RL) based RTB [Cai et al., 2017; Du et al., 2017;
Wu et al., 2018]. These studies mainly address the bid-
ding optimization problem for a single agent, neglecting the
stochastic behaviors of other bidders in the market. Jin et
al. [2018] and Zhao et al. [2018] extend the single agent
learning in RTB to a multi-agent bidding scenario. Jin
et al. [2018] adopt the Deep Deterministic Policy Gradi-
ents (DDPG) algorithm on the advertisers cluster level and
demonstrate the profit gain per bidder under the competing or
collaborating reward settings. However, one strong assump-
tion in this work is that each agent knows each other’s state.
In practice, the only information each bidder has about other
opponents are the market price in case of winning. In the
second price auctions, the winning price of the lost auctions
are censored which makes the bidding environment to be par-
tially observable. In this case, the bidder only knows the mar-
ket price should be higher than its own bid price.
To address the censorship problem, survival model has
been widely used in the medical domain to conduct the time-
to-death analysis [Miller Jr, 2011]. The market price esti-
mation has been commonly addressed by adopting a non-
parametric KaplanMeier estimator on an aggregated level
[Wang et al., 2016]. However, one aggregated distribution
for all the bid requests fails to capture the divergence in the
data. In [Ren et al., 2019], the authors proposed to adopt
the recurrent network to model the sequential pattern in the
feature space of the individual user and directly estimate the
market price probability. However, the features may not only
limited to the sequential dependencies.
The Transformer [Vaswani et al., 2017] is the first model
relying entirely on self-attention to compute a representa-
tions of its input without using convolutions or sequence
aligned recurrent neural networks [Graves et al., 2013]. It
has fueled much of the latest advancements, such as pre-
trained contextualized word embeddings [Peters et al., 2018;
Devlin et al., 2018; Radford et al., 2018] crucial to the suc-
cess of sequential tasks in natural language processing. In
this work, we adopt the transformer model as a non-linear ap-
proximation to the survival function as our opponent model.
In the multi-agent stochastic game, for each agent, it is es-
sential to model its opponent’s actions. The opponent ac-
tions are usually either modeled as i.i.d [Brown, 1951] or
as sequential actions with short-term history [Mealing and
Shapiro, 2013]. Hernandez-Leal and Kaisers [2017] assume
the opponent redraw strategies during a two-players repeated
stochastic game and the agent updates the belief of the op-
ponent model by its observations. Similar to the repeated
stochastic game setting in [Hernandez-Leal and Kaisers,
2017], our work focuses on repeated second price auctions
of the same ad campaign with unknown opponents. The key
difference is that we model RTB auctions as a multi-player
stochastic game and the opponents are not restricted to have
limited memory bounding.
In the repeated auctions, the existence of Mean Field Equi-
librium (MFE) under budget constraints has been theoreti-
cally proved in [Iyer et al., 2014; Gummadi et al., 2012].
Both studies showed that the value function for an agent to
reach the MFE takes the known fixed market price, budget,
and the observed utility distribution, for example, the esti-
mated click through rate (CTR) as inputs. In practice, the
market price is only partially observable to each bidder. In ad-
dition, the conventional RL learning algorithms like DDPG,
do not explicitly model the opponent’ss strategy. Therefore,
in our work, we firstly extend the MFE setting into the Q
function estimation in the DDPG algorithm. The opponent
model is integrated into Q values using an indicator function,
enforcing gradients to only flow through the actions which
will result in a reward over the estimated opponents actions.
We demonstrate the performance improvements of the opti-
mal MFE strategy from a single agent’s perspective.
3 Problem Formulation
In this section, we formulate the sequential second price auc-
tions as a multi-player stochastic game. Under the classic RL
setting, real time bidding process is usually formalized as a
Markov Decision Process (MDP) [Cai et al., 2017], which is
defined by four elements (S,A, T,R). A state si ∈ S de-
scribes the status of the agent at step i. The bid price is usu-
ally considered as the action ai ∈ A to take. However, the bid
price can be set to any number in the range of (0,∞). To gen-
eralize and limit the range of the action ai, like in [Jin et al.,
2018], in this paper, ai is normalized ranging from [0, 1]. The
optimal policy pi is a mapping from S to A which optimizes
the reward functionR of the agent, in which ri ∈ S×A 7→ R.
The transition function T defines the probability distributions
over the state space: T : S ×A 7→ Ω(S).
Different from the conventional RL, where a single agent
learns to react to the environment, a stochastic game describes
the strategic reaction of all the agents in the environment. In
such games, all the agents take actions at the same time, and
their actions influence the complex change of the environ-
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Figure 1: The architecture of the DDPG-OM model. The CTR and
opponent models are trained offline while the DDPG-OM model is
trained online.
ment. As defined in a stochastic game, at each time step, all
the agents choose their part of the joint action a ∈ A(s),
where s is the overall game state. In a two players game, for
example, the joint action is defined as a = (ai, a−i) where ai
is the action of player i and a−i is the action of its opponent.
The immediate reward ri is represented as ri(s,a). Corre-
spondingly, the transition probability T becomes T (s, s′,a),
where s′ is the next joint state of all agents.
In RTB, from a single bidding agent’s perspective, each
auction involves an unknown number of other bidders, a.k.a
opponents. Each bidder has different budget and target pref-
erences. Therefore, in every auction, the set of opponents are
highly stochastic. The winner of the auction only observes
the highest price from its opponents regardless the bid prices
from other bidders. In this way, the stochastic formulation of
RTB can be greatly simplified as a two players game. The
winning price can be modeled as the joint action from all
the other opponents and is partially observable. Unlike other
games where the status of the opponents are usually can be
seen, in RTB auctions, the opponent’s attributes remains un-
known.
In the ideal MFE scenario, it supposes that all the agents
take a fixed and steady bid distribution g and their own be-
lief of the bid valuation as the prior knowledge to optimize
their strategy[Iyer et al., 2014]. The policy that each agent
followed is stationary. In practice, the bid valuation is es-
timated by the CTR prediction model and the opponent bid
distribution is the market price model. Thus, in this work, we
adopted two pre-trained models into the framework to fulfill
the above assumption.
We consider the bidding process as an episodic task and
each episode consists ofK auctions. Each episode has a fixed
budget B = CPMtrain ×10−3×K× c0, where CPMtrain is the
cost per mille impressions in the training data and c0 is the
budget constraint ratio.
Fig. 1 depicts the architecture of the components used in
this work. The CTR model takes the feature vector x in the
historical bid requests as input and binary labels 0 and 1 indi-
cating impression and click respectively. The predicted Click
Through Rate (pCTR) is later used to construct the agent state
s and the reward r in the DDPG with Opponent Modeling
(DDPG-OM) model. In the following sections, the opponent
model and the DDPG-OM model are described in details.
3.1 Opponent Modeling
In this section, we focus on modeling the opponents actions,
a.k.a the market price distribution. The opponent model is
defined as the market price distribution at an impression level.
We use a−i to represent the action taken by the opponents,
a.k.a the highest price from all the other participants in the
auction. In this study, a−i = z, where z is the market price.
The probability density function (P.D.F) of z is pz(z).
pz(z) = P (a−i = z|x, θ) = hz
∏
j<z
(1− hj) (1)
As is shown in Eq. 1, the P.D.F of the market price can
be calculated from the instant hazard function hj which in-
dicates the probability of the instant occurrence of the event
at time j conditioned on the event has not happened prior to
time j. In the RTB setting,
∏
j<z(1− hj) represents the los-
ing probability of bidding less than the market price and hz
shows the probability of observing the market price z.
We take the features in the bid request as input and predict
the hazard function h over the discretized bid price space at
each impression level. The pz can be easily derived from
Eq. 1. For the uncensored data, the true label is an one-hot
encoded vector of size bmax with the element indexed by the
market price as 1.
We followed the loss functions in [Ren et al., 2019], for
the uncensored data, the loss of the observed market price is
defined as:
Lz = −
∑
x,a−i∈Duncensored
[loghz +
∑
j<z
log(1− hj)]
For the censored data, it is certain to still lose the auction
by bidding lower than the current price. The corresponding
loss is defined as:
Lcensored = −
∑
x,ai∈Dcensored
∑
j<ai
log(1− hj)
In addition, for the winning auctions, by bidding at any
price higher than the observed market price, it is guaranteed
to win the auction. Such information can be shared with the
censored data. The loss function is defined as followed:
Luncensored = −
∑
x,ai∈Duncensored
log[1−
∏
j<ai
(1− hj)]
The total loss of the model takes the combination of the
above losses as below where α balances the loss values.
Ltotal = αLz + (1− α)(Lcensored + Luncensored)
3.2 Bidding Model
Under our repeated second-price auctions setting, in every
auction, all the agents are facing the same bid request. The
agents bid for the same ad campaign upon different requests
with unknown number of opponents at each auction. The
RL agent adopts the framework of Deep Deterministic Pol-
icy Gradient (DDPG) [Lillicrap et al., 2015] method to learn
the policy in a continuous space.
State. For the DDPG agent, we take the budget left in an
episode Bi and the pCTR as the state s =< Bi, pCTR >
Action. Following the settings in [Jin et al., 2018], the
action ai is set to be a scaler which controls the bid price and
is bounded to be in the range of [0, 1]. The final bid price
is calculated by bf = min(bmax × ai, Bi), where bmax is
the upper bound of the bid price. The market price or the
aggregated actions from the opponents are denoted as a−i.
Reward. The reward is usually the Key Performance In-
dicator (KPI) defined by the advertisers, for instance, a click,
a purchase or the profits. But such reward signal is usually
too sparse for the agent to learn. Therefore, in this study, we
assign the pCTR as the reward for all the winning auctions,
even without the real click. For the losing auctions, since no
price is paid, the reward remains as zero. For agent i, the ac-
tor network takes state s, which consists of the predicted CTR
and the budget left in the current episode, and parameterized
with θpi for a deep neural network which provides an action
to take in the range of [0, 1].
Action function
ai = pii(si, θpi) = pii([bi, pCTRi], θpi) (2)
In the vanilla version of DDPG algorithm, the critic func-
tion Q(si, ai) takes the state and action pair from a single
agent. In our model, the Q-function is approximated by the
mean field theory by integrating the opponent’s action dis-
tribution. As is shown in Eq. 3, φ(a−i|x, θz) is the market
distribution obtained from the opponent model. The action
a−i is not directly observed from the environment, since the
result of the auction can only be see after placing a bid price.
The market distribution provides the agent’s belief of the op-
ponents actions. The indicator function allows the agent to
account for the Q value only in the case of bidding higher
than the market price. Since when the action ai is lower than
a−i, the agent cannot win such auctions, thus, the Q value
should be zero.
Critic function
Q(s,a) =
∫
a−i
Q(s, ai, a−i)φ(a−i|x, θz)1[a−i < ai] da−i
(3)
The pseudo code of the DDPG with Opponent-Model
(DDPG-OM) algorithm is shown in Alg. 1.
3.3 Single Agent Steady Market Distribution
We start from the simplest scenario: a single agent bids
against the steady market price distribution. In this setting,
we assume the linear bidders have fixed strategies which
means they do not update their strategies upon other bidders’
actions. In addition, given the dynamic attributes of the bid-
ders, from agent i’s point of view, the bids from its oppo-
nents are identically and independently distributed. As we
discussed in 1, in practice, the opponent sets in every auction
changes over time. Here we assume the departure and the
arrival rate of bidders remains steady, which guarantees the
stationary of the bid price distribution of the opponents. Even
that the opponent bids are partially observable, this allows us
to approximate a fixed opponent model and use it in the mean
field model.
Algorithm 1: DDPG-OM
Initialize actor network pi(s, θpi) = ai and critic network
Q(s, a|ω) with weights θpi , ω
Initialize target network pi′ and Q′ with θ′pi ← θpi and
ω′ ← ω
Initialize replay memory with size K;
for episode = 1 to E do
receive state s0 and sample a0 ∼ pi(s0, θpi);
Initialize a noise generator N for action exploration
while si not terminate do
Select an action ai = pi(si, θpi) +Ni and execute
;
Observe ri, si+1;
Store (si, ai, ri, si+1) in the replay memory;
if t ≡ 0 mod K then
sample a minibatchM from the replay
memory
yj = rj + γQ
′(sj+1,a′j+1, |ω′)
update critic by minimizing the loss
L = 1M
∑
j(yj −Q(sj ,aj |ω))2 ;
update actor θ ← θ + 1M
∑
j
∇aQ(sj ,aj |ω)|s=sj ,a=pi(sj)∇θpipi(sj |θpi)|sj ;
update target network:
θ′ ← τθpi + (1− τ)θpi;
ω′ ← τω + (1− τ)ω
end
end
3.4 Multi-Agent Mean Field Approximation
From the above single agent scenario, here we extend to dis-
cuss the mean field equilibrium. Instead of considering only
one agent, we focus on the multi agent environment, where all
agents assume to share one steady bid distribution φ. Taken
φ as the prior knowledge, each agent optimizes their bidding
strategy which in turn induces dynamics in the overall bid dis-
tribution. The mean field equilibrium requires a consistency
check of the bid distribution [Iyer et al., 2014]. Let φ be a bid
distribution and pii denote a stationary policy for an agent fac-
ing bidding decision. The mean field equilibrium is achieved
if it satisfies the following definition:
Definition 1 The repeated second-price auction Mean Field
games admit at least one mean field equilibrium (MFE)[Iyer
et al., 2014], with strategy pi, if:
1. pi(·|φ) is an optimal strategy given φ.
2. φ is the steady state bid distribution given pi.
In this game, we assume that the number of competing
agents is large. For each auction, a finite number of agents
is randomly selected (through Gaussian noise randomly se-
lected a competing agent, the agent with the largest noise
added one is effectively selected). Each agent has a random
life-time, which is exponentially distributed with unit mean.
It optimizes the utility over its lifetime. The unit mean is
effectively the fact that each agent starts with the same bud-
get, however the varying lifetime depends on the pCTR val-
ues estimated and also the exponentially distributed additive
noise. At either the end of the episode or when the budget has
been exhausted, agents are replaced by new ones whose ini-
tial budget, valuation distribution and income is sampled. In
most experiments, instead of randomly sampling budget we
initialized this to the same value, and noticed no difference in
convergence guarantees. Due to a learning rate decay, even-
tually the DDPG agent will converge to a stationary agent
(learning rate ≈ 0), thus the normal theorem by [Iyer et al.,
2014] holds.
In the MFE, each bidder are facing i.i.d highest opponent
bids and has no incentive to change her bidding strategy.
However, it is important to note that before the equilibrium
is reached, the bid distribution would change as the market
evolves. Thus it is important for the agents to infer the bid
distribution over time.
4 Experiments
In this work, the experiments are conducted over the public
real-world dataset, iPinYou, one of the leading ad companies
in China. The dataset contains the original bid logs and the la-
bels of click and purchase. We follow the data pre-processing
and feature engineering procedure in [Zhang et al., 2014b].
Since in the iPinYou dataset, it records the original market
price of the impressions, we initiate all the agents with the
budget to be proportional to the total cost in the training data:
c0= 1/16, 1/8, and 1/4. In this way, it allows us to simulate
the auctions offline. Given each bid request, each agent in the
environment places a bid price and follows the second-price
auction principles 1. The original market price in the log is
not included in the environment.
In Fig 1, the CTR estimator is trained offline by adopting
the widely used FTRL-logistic regression model [McMahan
et al., 2013]. In both single and multi agent scenarios, we
begin with running the bidding simulation over the training
set and log the bid price of each agent and select the second
highest price as the market price. The opponent model in
Figure 1 takes the simulated bid log and the features in the
original bid requests as input to predict the impression level
market distribution as described in Section 3.1.
Once the CTR model and the opponent model are trained,
we repeat the bidding simulation on both train and test set.
In this round, the DDPG agent learns the policy while having
the prediction of the distribution of its opponent. We begin
with setting one DDPG agent in the environment and keep the
other bidders using simple and static bidding strategies, for
instance, linear bidding function. In this setting, we demon-
strate the advantage of the learning agent over the static agent
without the learning process. Furthermore, we extend to the
multi-agent scenario where all the agents learn their strategies
with its estimated opponent model.
In this study, every 1000 auctions is defined as one epoch.
The budget resets at the beginning of each epoch.
4.1 Opponent Model
In this section, we compare the general behaviour of the
DASA model with other survival analysis models. The ex-
periments are conducted on 3 datasets: Clinic[Knaus et al.,
1The experiment code will be available for the final version
Table 1: Performance comparison on and ANLP
Models ANLPCLINIC MUSIC BIDDING
KM* 9.012 7.270 14.012
Lasso-Cox* 5.307 28.983 34.941
Gamma* 4.610 6.326 5.941
STM* 3.780 5.707 4.977
MTLSA* 17.759 25.121 9.979
DeepSurv* 5.345 29.002 35.405
DeepHit* 5.027 5.523 5.513
DRSA* 3.337 5.132 4.598
DASA (One Stack Transformer) 2.786 4.912 3.465
1995], Music[J. and S., 2017], and Bidding dataset. The
statistics of the datasets can be found in [Ren et al., 2019].
The data is processed and the results with * in Table 1 are
reproduced in the same way by using their publicly avail-
able code 2 and datasets 3 and served as baselines in this
study. The evaluation metric is the average negative log prob-
ability (ANLP) of the market price, which corresponds to
the true market price likelihood loss. The result shows the
DASA model significantly outperforms other methods across
all three datasets. Thus it is selected as our opponent model
for the experiments in the following sections.
4.2 Single DDPG agent with Steady Market
Distribution
In this section, we assume that there is one learning agent
running DDPG algorithm and competing against N bidders
with fixed strategies, for example, a linear bidding function.
In practice,N is always unknown and for each auction, a ran-
dom set of the N bidders is selected. In addition, the set of
bidders may at different stage of their lifetime with different
budget left. In the second-price auction, the most important
opponent is the bidder with the second highest price among
all the bidders. In this study, we set up two linear bidders and
one DDPG bidder. The bidders take the same pCTR from
the CTR prediction model. By injecting Gaussian noises into
the pCTR, we simulate the stochastic environment of random
bidders with different at each auction. The bid price of the
DDPG agent are compared with the price generated by the
linear bidders and the new market price is logged and used as
the input for training the survival model. The survival model
is trained offline which takes the features x in the bid log
and the winning or losing signal from the environment as de-
scribed in Sec.4.1.
In the next round, we replay the bidding game again to train
the same DDPG agent from scratch with the opponent model
integrated. In Figure 2, the number of clicks obtained by the
three bidders are listed for one selected ad campaign, 2259.
In Figure 3, it shows the number of impressions each agent
won in each epoch. The rows represents three budget settings,
where c0= 1/8, 1/4, and 1/2. The left column are the results
from DDPG agent without opponent model as the baseline
while the right column shows the DDPG agent with oppo-
2https://github.com/rk2900/drsa.
3https://www.dropbox.com/s/q5x1q0rnqs7otqn/drsa-data.zip?
dl=0.
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Figure 2: camp.2259 winning clicks
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Figure 3: camp.2259 winning impressions
nent model. By having the opponent model, the DDPG agent
starts dominating the bidding game. Since the other agents
are unaware of the market change, they always bid propor-
tionally to the predicted CTR.
We need to note that, the budget was set by referring to the
original market price in the iPinyou bidding log. But the new
market price generated by the agents are different and lower.
Thus, it is the reason that for some campaign like 3358, and
2821, even with c0 = 0.25, it is sufficient for the DDPG
agent to dominate the other linear bidders without the oppo-
nent model. When the DDPG dominates the game, the market
price model is approximately fully observable, thus, the gain
becomes insignificant. At the beginning of their campaign
lifetime, without any information of the market, the learning
agent converges to a steady but sub-optimal strategy. How-
ever, if they infer the opponents model quickly and the oppo-
nents have fixed strategy, the DDPG-OM model facilities the
bidder to converge to a more dominant strategy in the market.
If the other agents adopt learning process into their strategies
which evolves the bid distribution, the challenge would be to
show the asynchronous best response from all the agents and
converge to the MFE which is shown in the next section.
4.3 Multi-agent game
In this section, the experiment is extended to have multiple
learning agents in the same environment. As is shown in the
first row in Figure 4, the 3 agents start with bidding by only
Table 2: Clicks gain of DDPG-OM under different budget settings
camp. c0=0.125 c0=0.25
2259 153% 266%
2821 164% 2.8%
3358 107% -5.4%
learning from its own reward without referring to other bid-
ders’ behaviour. After 200 epochs, the game converge to the
equilibrium where the number of impressions won by each
agent roughly evenly distributed. In the second row, the mar-
ket distribution per impression is sampled from an uniform
distribution. In this case, it increased the variance of the num-
ber of the impressions won in each episode and some agent
may converge to a dominating strategy. We take the bidding
log generated by the first game and trained a market model
separately for each agent based on the set of impressions they
won. With the information of the market, we reset the game
for the training set, as is shown in the third row in Figure 4.
The agents converge the optimal strategies within 100 epochs
which is 50% less than the results in the first row. We fur-
ther test the model on the test set, which shows the model is
generalized well and the equilibrium is reached.
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Figure 4: 3 ddpg agents bidding game. Row 1: without market
model. Row 2: with random market model. Row 3: with DASA
model Row 4: test set
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a general opponent aware bidding
algorithm with no prior assumptions on the opponents bid-
ding distribution. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first
experimental implementation in the real-time bidding domain
to infer the partially observable opponents in the policy learn-
ing process. We proposed a deep attentive survival model as
the impression level opponent model. The multi-agent bid-
ding simulations show the benefits of improved convergence
rates for the DDPG model across all budgets with augmented
with an opponent model. For the future work, we will in-
vestigate the online training for the opponent model in the
multi-agent bidding game.
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